.
As such agreements, driven by actors within the government, increase in popularity, the Supreme Court will find that it has a lesser role to play in the settlement of disputes between levels of governments. Katherine
Swinton also pushes the Supreme
Court into a secondary role, saying -The primary institution for dealing with the problems of interdependence and change in the Canadian federal system has been executive federalism‖ (Swinton, 1992: 137 (Baier, 2008: 35) . This means that the Court is not looked to as often as it was in the years directly We can certainly see in the arguments made above that -intergovernmental negotiations have replaced the courts as the primary venue of change in the federation‖ (Baier, 2008: 23) . They are not legally enforceable contracts. Nor are they equivalent to statutes‖ (Simeon and Nugent, 2008: 96) . This seems like an obvious principle; agreements made in the political arena will remain there, allowing them to be untouchable by the judiciary, and amendable only by further collaborative decision-making.
The problem is that, in an era of asymmetrical federalism, when federal governments are known to use their spending power to exert huge influence over the provinces, the lack of legal status for these agreements can be quite troubling. As Katherine Swinton explains, -To the extent that these instruments are relatively easy to change or are unenforceable, they may be unsatisfactory to a province like Quebec which is seeking a lasting rearrangement of jurisdiction‖ (Swinton, 1992: 140) [but] political leaders do not need to bring the agreement back to their respective legislatures to vote on it‖ (Smith, 2004: 105) . Those and… Parliament or a legislature has the ability to change its agreements without warning or in an unfair manner with the sanction being a political one, rather than a legal one‖ (Swinton, 1992: 143) . In reality, governments can make alterations to their agreements without any advance warning, and will face no real legal consequences.
In the end, though governments may try to create dispute-resolution bodies that are modeled on the 
